As we are nearing the end of 2025, the human rights situation for (LGBTQIA+) asylum seekers and refugees in Sweden and beyond is looking dire. Due to the proliferation of increasingly restrictive and hostile asylum and migration legislation, coupled with the codification of an EU-wide migration and asylum system which normalizes deportation, externalization of border control, detention, arbitrary usage of the “safe country” principle and surveillance, while circumventing international law standards and conventions, (LGBTQIA+) forced migrants now find themselves in an extremely precarious position. In this article, we will discuss EU-wide developments and specific asylum and migration law changes in Sweden which actively contribute to the further victimization of those most vulnerable, namely queer asylum seekers and refugees.

On the EU level, we can detect an overarching trend of hollowing out the right to asylum (Civil Rights Defenders, 2024):

• The New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, to be applied in 2026, proposes various tools which will amplify the risks for human rights violations and increased vulnerability for all forced migrants and asylum seekers. Under the new Pact, the use of intrusive surveillance technology, including AI technologies, is promoted.  “Data collected from third-country nationals when crossing the external borders may be used later to verify/assess applicants’ protection claims”, while “checks and assessments at the external borders are set to play an even greater role in the asylum process” (Dumbrava, 2025). Through surveillance technology deployed at borders and detention centers, people’s personal data will be increasingly policed, allowing for biometric identification systems to track movements, identify, racially filter and control those entering or already residing in Europe. Moreover, the new Pact enables the use of factors such as nationality as a proxy for race and ethnicity in the assessments procedure and will, through strict screening and border procedures, lead to more people, including children and families, to being arbitrarily held in prison-like detention centers (PICUM, 2024). As part of the new Pact, the practice of detention for vulnerable forced migrants will as such be expanded, paving the way for an avalanche of systematic human rights violations in detention facilities. For example, the proposed screening regulation does not guarantee that children would have access to legal assistance, and undocumented people already living in Europe may be apprehended and detained for up to three days without free legal aid (PICUM, 2025).

The expansion of the ‘safe third country’ concept is another worrisome development within the new Pact. The review of the ‘safe third country’ concept in the Asylum Procedures Regulation “seeks to remove the current requirement for a personal connection between the asylum seeker and a third country where it is deemed they should have sought protection in the first place” (Amnesty International, 2025). In this way, asylum seekers may be offshored to third countries they have no connection or link to, in which they are subsequently likely to face social, political and legal isolation and precarity. Importantly, accelerated border and return/deportation procedures, enabled through the fast-track system, are likely to subject LGBTQIA+ forced migrants and asylum seekers to violence, persecution and harassment in third countries and in their countries of origin.

Overall, the new Pact constitutes a step toward the further criminalization, illegalization and discrimination of vulnerable migrants. Arguably, the new Pact also bypasses the principle of Non-Refoulement, entrenched in the 1951 Refugee Convention, “which prohibits the return of a refugee to a territory where they may be at risk of persecution, torture, or other forms of serious or irreparable harm” (UNHCR, 2025).

• Additionally, in March 2025, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Return Regulation to replace the current Return Directive. The proposal promotes the establishment of return hubs and expands the number of countries to which asylum seekers can be returned against their will beyond the country of origin and stipulates that all member states must recognize and enforce the return decisions made in other EU countries. The proposal also increases the detention duration to up to 24 months and includes an entry ban throughout the Schengen area for up to 10 years, weakens access to legal aid, erases the suspensive effect of appeals (Molaaghaei, 2025). The new Return Directive is deeply punitive and disproportional, putting asylum seekers and forced migrants, including LGBTQIA+ asylum seekers, in a state of instability, insecurity and vulnerability, while greatly increasing their deportability.       

In Sweden, a variety of asylum and migration law changes have been implemented in 2025, while other previous restrictive developments have remained in place, including:

• 1.  Accommodation: From 1 September 2025, the main rule is that asylum seekers must live in the accommodation allocated by the Swedish Migration Agency in order to be entitled to daily allowance and special grant (Migrationsverket, 2025). Previously, asylum seekers were able to arrange their own accommodation (EBO) during their assessment procedure and still be entitled to daily allowance. This option has now been erased. This development is especially worrisome for LGBTQIA+ asylum seekers, in particular transgender asylum seekers, as the asylum accommodation system in Sweden continues to rely on heteronormative and cisnormative values. This fuels homo- and transphobia in asylum accommodations, leading to threats, harassment and violence towards queer asylum seekers. (Wimark, 2021). Rather than adjusting the accommodation system for queer asylum seekers to their specific needs and making structural changes to guarantee their safety and dignity in accommodation centers, this change instead perpetuates the vulnerability and othering of marginalized SOGIESC asylum seekers.

• 2. Track change: From 1 April 2025, the possibility of changing tracks will end. This affects those who have been granted, or applied for, a work permit after an asylum application has been rejected. Your co-applicant family members will also be affected. This affects those who applied for a work permit without leaving Sweden after their asylum application was rejected. They will no longer be able to be granted a new or extended residence permit on the basis of work (Migrationsverket, 2025). The rejection rate for LGBTQIA+ asylum seekers in Sweden is extremely high. For many, finding work in Sweden and applying for a work permit remained as one of the only pathways toward escaping persecution and finding safety and stability in Sweden. This option has now been erased, which exacerbates the deportability of queer asylum seekers and exposes them to further violence when they are forcibly returned to their country of origin.

• 3. Statutory limitation period: Until the last of March 2025, the statutory limitation period (how long a decision to leave Sweden is valid) was four years from the date the decision gained the force of law. People who had received a decision that they must leave Sweden (a decision on rejection or expulsion) were able to apply for asylum again after four years, regardless of whether they had left Sweden or not. On 1 April, the statutory limitation period for rejection and deportation decisions changed to five years, starting from the day the person leaves Sweden in accordance with their decision (Migrationsverket, 2025). The prolonged statutory limitation period results in an increased fear of being deported among queer asylum seekers and is likely to force them into deeper hiding, and as a result precarious into conditions, rather than having the anticipated effect of “effectively” returning rejected applicants to their countries of origin.

• 4. The increased maintenance requirement has remained in place since November 2023, when the Swedish government decided to increase the maintenance requirement for work permits. Applicants must have a monthly salary that amounts to at least 80 per cent of the current median salary in Sweden. The monthly salary must also be in line with collective agreements or common practice in the relevant profession or industry (Migrationsverket, 2025). More recently, in January 2026, the wage level for labor immigration was adjusted to 90 per cent of the median wage in Sweden. The current stricter maintenance requirement limits the economic and social integration of newcomers, including LGBTQIA+ migrants in Sweden, as well as the availability of options for queer asylum seekers to build a safe, empowered life in the Swedish context without fear of being deported, and arguably filters out “undesirable” migrant workers towards a racialized Swedish labor market. Moreover, queer asylum seekers, refugees and migrants consistently face higher precarity and un- and underemployment, while experiencing significant difficulties when trying to obtain employment in formal sectors. As such, these requirements are unrealistic and, in the process, further victimize queer migrants. 

• 5. In September 2025, a government inquiry (Miniminivåutredningen) proposed the introduction of a special law on the revocation of permanent residence permits. The proposed law will apply to individuals who have been granted permanent residence permits as refugees, under subsidiary protection, quota refugees, and those with long-term resident status in Sweden. The proposed law envisions the replacement of permanent residence permits with temporary ones. (Miniminivåutredningen, 2025). The law is proposed to come into effect on January 1, 2027 and could affect almost 200 000 people. The proposed law puts those most vulnerable, including queer refugees residing in Sweden, into an extreme condition of uncertainty, insecurity and destabilization. Through transforming the previously promised permanent residency status into a temporary legal status, the proposal greatly undermines the trust of people in the state, hinders sustainable and successful integration in Sweden and primarily punishes those who have long contributed to making the Swedish society and labor market stronger and who have built themselves a stable and integrated life.

• 6. Withdrawal of residence permit in case of ‘dishonorable behavior’: A government inquiry presented its findings in 1 April 2025, proposing, among other things, that a fundamental requirement of ‘good conduct’ be reintroduced into the Aliens Act for the assessment of whether an individual should be permitted to enter or reside in Sweden. It also proposes that an individual’s dishonorable conduct may constitute grounds for refusing or revoking a residence permit not based on EU law (Swedish Refugee Law Center, 2025). This proposal paves the way for arbitrary and unlawful deportations, especially of queer asylum seekers and refugees trapped in precarious conditions, and for the further criminalization of perceived migrant ‘Others’ through vague and racially profiled regulations.

• 7. Stricter rules for family migration: On September 5, 2025, SOU 2025:95, “Stricter Conditions for Family Immigration,” was published. Stricter measures include, but are not limited to: longer waiting periods to be eligible to bring family, higher maintenance requirements for sponsors, and restrictions on family circle. The changes fundamentally violate the right to family life, and introduce more obstacles for vulnerable forced migrants, including queer migrants, to be united with the families, which in return jeopardizes their integration and promotes further social isolation.

On a broader level, these changes in the Swedish context are enveloped by the Tidö Agreement. Most importantly, the Tidö Agreement has been characterized by “various actions to be undertaken (…) to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers will be restricted to a minimum level in accordance with international obligations” (Swedish Refugee Law Center, 2025). For example, a government inquiry chair has been tasked to reassess migration and asylum related rights and to suggest possible restrictions within this field. The inquiry is actively looking into avenues for removing permanent residency permits for asylum applicants, and for revoking already existing permanent presidency permits, and to replace them with temporary permits. Moreover, the inquiry is evaluating which possible restrictions can be made in regards to legal representatives, interpreters and general reception conditions. Proposals from the inquiry also include a longer period of residence in Sweden (eight years) and more stringent requirements for demonstrating good conduct in order to acquire Swedish citizenship. Plans for high financial incentives for “voluntary return” have been pursued, amounting to up to 350, 000 SEK per adult (idem). The Tidö agreement also neglects any discussion related to the legislative work done on an EU level as pertains to the human rights of migrants. Similarly, human rights violations for which the EU is jointly responsible, namely carried out at the/ in border spaces, are not mentioned, signaling an utter lack of concern by the Swedish government for migrants’ human rights (Civil Rights Defenders, 2022: 9). Many of the agreement’s measures disproportionately intensify the risks faced by vulnerable groups, including LGBTQIA+ asylum seekers and refugees, as well as ethnic and religious minorities, and “seem to be motivated by racist stereotypes about those who are assumed to participate in a certain type of crime (namely= immigrants)” (idem: 14). Overall, all these developments in relation to migration and asylum in Sweden can be considered incompatible with International Human Rights Law, undermine forced migrants, asylum seekers and refugees’ (including LGBTQIA+ persons within these groups) security, well-being and residence, contribute to increasingly oppressive and punitive conditions for newcomers, restrict fundamental democratic rights and freedoms and push those most vulnerable further to the margins, into deeper hiding, greater instability and precarity.

RFSL Newcomers Malmö calls on all Swedish stakeholders and decision-makers involved in migration and asylum issues: (LGBTQIA+) forced migrants, asylum seekers and refugees find themselves at the intersection of complex vulnerabilities on the basis of their legal status, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression and sex characteristics. In order to live a dignified and empowered life and to sustainably integrate into Swedish society, they are in need of a migration and asylum system which provides pathways for permanent residency, security, stability, and which firmly reflects and applies human rights standards.

By Kaja Simmen

References

Amnesty International. (2025). Joint statement: EU ‘safe country’ and return proposals would seriously undermine protection and human dignity. [Online]. Available at: https://www.amnesty.eu/news/eu-safe-country-and-return-proposals-would-seriously-undermine-protection/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Civil Rights Defenders. (2022). THE TIDÖ AGREEMENT REVIEW A RIGHTS-BASED REVIEW OF THE TIDÖ AGREEMENT. Available at: https://share.google/F59nXSkBvjoEcC5qJ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Civil Rights Defenders. (2024). The EU’s new migration and asylum pact hollows out the right to asylum. [Online]. Available at: https://crd.org/2024/04/11/the-eus-new-migration-and-asylum-pact-hollows-out-the-right-to-asylum/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Dumbrava, C. (2025). Artificial intelligence in asylum procedures in the EU. European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)775861 (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Migrationsverket. (2025). A good living – maintenance requirement for work permits. [Online]. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/en/word-explanations/a-good-living—maintenance-requirement-for-work-permits.html (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Migrationsverket. (2025). Changed rules for statute of limitations, re-entry ban and track change. [Online]. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/nyheter/news-archive/2025-04-01-changed-rules-for-statute-of-limitations-re-entry-ban-and-track-change.html (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Migrationsverket. (2025). Changed rules on asylum seekers’ accommodation. [Online]. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/en/news-archive/news/2025-09-01-changed-rules-on-asylum-seekers-accommodation.html (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Migrationsverket. (2025). From 1 April, the possibility of changing tracks will end. [Online]. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/nyheter/news-archive/2025-04-01-from-1-april-the-possibility-of-changing-tracks-will-end.html (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Miniminivåutredningen. (2025). Ändring av permanent uppehållstillstånd för vissa utlänningar. Regeringskansliet. Available at: https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2025/09/sou-202599/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Molaaghaei, A. N. (2025). New EU deportation rules face massive criticism. Refugees Welcome. [Online]. Available at: https://refugeeswelcome.dk/en/information/news/new-eu-deportation-rules-face-massive-criticism/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

PICUM. (2024). The EU Migration Pact: a dangerous regime of migrant surveillance. [Online]. Available at: https://picum.org/blog/the-eu-migration-pact-a-dangerous-regime-of-migrant-surveillance/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

PICUM. (2025). EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. [Online]. Available at: https://picum.org/blog/eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Swedish Refugee Law Center (2025) Overview of the main changes since the previous report update: Sweden. Aida. [Online]. Available at: https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/sweden/overview-main-changes-previous-report-update/ (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

UNHCR. (2025). The 1951 Refugee Convention. [Online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/overview/1951-refugee-convention (Last Accessed: December 17, 2025).

Wimark, T. (2021) ‘Housing policy with violent outcomes – the domestication of queer asylum seekers in a heteronormative society’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 47 no. 3, pp. 703–722. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1756760.